in agriculture. 8 Furthermore, most scholars continue to consider "tradition-bound" peasants as being hostile to modernisation, and responsible for the absent agricultural and industrial revolutions in Southeast Europe. 9 This conventional wisdom has been challenged by only a few economists and historians. Zagorov et al., 10 Berend 11 and more recently Ivanov and Tooze 12 refer to the significant increase in farm output per unit of land (land productivity would be a better term) after the First World War, which in their opinion indicates a shift away from extensive growth (tables 1 and 2). These authors believe that by 1914 Bulgaria and Southeast Europe in general had reached the limits of extensive growth in agriculture because the expansion of cultivated land lost its original dynamics after the First World War. Even revisionists, though, are cautious, describing these changes as "a transition to a higher stage of farming" or "significant steps towards modern capitalist farming", but stopping short of calling it "agricultural transformation" or "modern growth".
To date, both optimists and pessimists have ignored the radical change of paradigm in developing economics and subsequently in economic history, which has led to a rehabilitation of peasants as engines of economic modernisation. 13 According to the recent state of research, agricultural revolutions did not precede industrialisation during the nineteenth century in Western and Central Europe, but rather occurred simultaneously to urbanisation and industrialisation. Moreover, it is now clear that urbanisation and industrialisation induced an agricultural revolution, and not vice versa. 14 Accelerating agricultural development was (and still is) a demand-driven 8 process that needed, more than anything else, promising long-term sales prospects on food markets from a booming secondary sector. It is also now clear that the old development mantra, which asserted that rural areas could and should be neglected in order to foster industrial growth has created gigantic development ruins. 15 However, a consensus has emerged in modern development economics that only a broad-based "balanced growth" in all sectors leads to sustained economic modernisation. Achieving the necessary high level of agricultural growth requires substantial resources to be channelled into farming. Moreover, effective agricultural transformation does not depend on a certain agricultural structure. 16 Structural transformation from an agrarian to an industrial economy depends on two processes: − In agriculture, extensive growth based on the augmentation of factor input has to develop into modern growth whose main source is improved productivity (increased total factor productivity). 28 (2012) , <http://ehes.org/working_papers.html>, 1.10.2016. 15 This mantra goes back to Karl Marx, and even dominated non-Marxist Western development economics unchallenged until the 1960s. 16 Charles Peter Timmer, The Agricultural Transformation, in Eicher / Staatz (eds), International Agricultural Development, 113-135. Sources: Authors' own calculations; for the sources of data see Ivanov, The Gross Domestic Product as well as Ivanov / Tooze, Convergence or Decline. Notes: 1) total farm output contains total crop production and total livestock production and also includes apiculture and sericulture; 2) total farm output per hectare farm land (1911-prices, Leva); 3) total farm output per capita rural population (1911-prices, Leva); 4) total farm land divided by rural population; 5) total output of rural home industry (1911-prices, Leva); 6) total output of rural home industry per capita rural population (1911-prices, Leva).
Reinterpreted, European Historical Economics Society Working Papers in Economic History
− Industry must be able to absorb the emerging agricultural labour surplus. One of the most important findings of modern development economics is that the premature release of labour out of agriculture does not induce industrialisation as once believed, but only leads to a rapid spread of rural poverty. Adopting this revisionist paradigm and following Hayami and Ruttan's theory of induced innovation, 17 in section two we make use of the decomposition of labour productivity into land productivity and land-man ratio to analyse whether Bulgarian peasant agriculture was able to start its transition from extensive to intensive growth. Drawing on extensive new data on Bulgarian GDP and agriculture from 1870-1945 18 we conduct a simple but still conclusive tentative analysis of the sources of Bulgarian agricultural growth. 19 This exercise will allow us to provide fresh and far more convincing evidence of whether Bulgarian peasants did cross the threshold to modern growth during 17 Yujiro Hayami / Vernon W. Ruttan, Agricultural Development. An International Perspective. Baltimore/OH 1985, 117-129. 18 Ivanov, The Gross Domestic Product. 19 Presently it is not possible to estimate a production function due to a lack of data on farm capital. Further research should aim to reconstruct the agricultural capital stock. the interwar period and what the economic, social and political implications were. The third section offers further evidence, which speaks in favour of a Bulgarian "first green revolution". In section four we discuss the scope for discretionary decision-making of Bulgarian governments and peasants under the extremely adverse conditions of the interwar period. More importantly, we will examine to which extent they did utilise their given scope for action. Merely not exploiting their own potential could, under certain circumstances, constitute a self-inflicted (peasant) "modernisation failure", but not the non-existence of options. In this context we will consider in section five whether the decision of a series of Bulgarian interwar governments to concentrate on agriculture was really a fundamental mistake as suggested by Gerschenkron and others, or rather was the only possible way to prevent a Malthusian catastrophe and maintain economic growth.
Bulgaria's "First Green Revolution": A Quantitative Analysis
During the interwar period the annual average growth rate of total farm output jumped from just 0.91 percent (1887-1911) to 3.50 percent (1921) (1922) (1923) (1924) (1925) (1926) (1927) (1928) (1929) (1930) (1931) (1932) (1933) (1934) (1935) (1936) (1937) (1938) (1939) . This extraordinary growth did not flatten after the post-war reconstruction period came to an end in 1925-1929 indicating that agriculture switched on a new more dynamic growth trajectory during the interwar period despite the Great Depression. 20 What really makes the difference between the prewar and the interwar period is the development of the important land to labour ratio and of land productivity (tables 1 and 2, figures 1 and 2). As demonstrated below still the easy to calculate land to labour ratio provides important insights into the nature of technical change and thus of productivity in agriculture. In Bulgaria the land to labour ratio defined as farm land divided by the rural population more or less continuously decreased from 1.26 ha to 0.91 hectare between 1889-1891 and 1921-1923, but remained roughly constant afterwards (table  2 and figure 1) . 21 Meanwhile, the growth dynamics of land productivity quintupled from 0.48 percent per year from 1887-1911, to 2.49 percent for [1921] [1922] [1923] [1924] [1925] [1926] [1927] [1928] [1929] [1930] [1931] [1932] [1933] [1934] [1935] [1936] [1937] [1938] [1939] (table 1  and figure 2) . 22 Thus, despite further expansion of the agricultural area to marginal and less productive lands during the interwar period, yields around 1937/39 were on average 52 percent higher than 1909-1911. Concomitantly, the growth of agricultural 20 During the war period of 1912-1918, total farm output had fallen to 58 percent of the prewar level in 1918. Only in 1925 was the 1911-prewar level of farm production again realised. 21 Due to the fact that a continuous time series is only available for the rural population but not for the agricultural population, the former was used to calculate the land to labour ratio. However, the growth of the entire rural population developed nearly identically to the agricultural population, and the shares in total population of both indicators are almost identical. 22 Land productivity passed prewar levels in 1925. Even afterwards, land productivity increased annually, at 2.05 percent (1926-39), four times faster than before the First World War. population as the best available indicator for agricultural labour halved during the interwar period, from 2. 4 (1921-1926) annually to 1.2 percent (1934) (1935) (1936) (1937) (1938) (1939) (1940) (1941) (1942) (1943) (1944) (1945) (1946) . 23 Despite promising signs of a Western European-style "agricultural take-off", Bulgarian farm labour productivity stagnated from 1887-1939. It decreased not only during the war years but during peacetime as well c. 1890-1910. This productivity began to increase only after the First World War, though from an extremely low starting point. The poor initial level of 1890 was not again reached before the early 1930s. Over the entire period 1887-1939 farm labour productivity increased annually by a negligible 0.01 percent, which equated with stagnation (table 1, 2 and figure 3). This was quite the opposite of what happened in the European "core" during its "first green revolution", and speaks in favour of fundamental weaknesses outside agriculture, which prevented a full-scale structural transformation. In the following we will look for the reasons that only a "restricted first Bulgarian green revolution" took place during the interwar period, which definitely did not proceed in the ideal-typical Western European manner characterised by boosting farm labour productivity.
Contrary to what Ivanov and Tooze 24 insist, the fact that land productivity and intensity of land use increased -even dramatically -does not necessarily mean that Bulgarian agriculture began to switch from extensive to intensive or modern growth. 25 According to standard growth theory and all available evidence, land productivity can 23 Calculations using occupational census data taken from Ivanov / Stanev, Structural Change. Growth rates of the agricultural population fell from 2.01 (1921) (1922) (1923) (1924) (1925) (1926) to 0. 78 percent (1934-1939) . Even if rural Bulgaria was indeed a "peasant economy", it has to be considered that peasants gained parts of their income from non-agricultural activities. Based on peasant household data from 1940/1941 Ivanov and Stanov estimated that Bulgarian peasants on average devoted 8.8 per cent of their working time to off-farm occupations in the secondary and tertiary sector (ibidem, 9f.). However, most of the non-agricultural activities were either on-farm activities mainly for household consumption or took place within the framework of the rural economy. In 1890, for example, rural home production equaled around 16 percent of the primary sector's total income (excluding mining but including all industrial on-farm activities). This share did not fall below 9 percent until the eve of the Second World War (table 4). Contemporary Bulgarian experts correctly defined peasant farms as "Workers'" family farms", Theodor Berberoff, Die landwirtschaftlichen Betriebssysteme Bulgariens. Berlin 1935 (Berichte über Landwirtschaft, 114), 48. 24 Ivanov / Tooze, Convergence or Decline. 25 Following Ricardo, extensive growth in agriculture can be achieved in two ways. The first way is to extend the cultivated area to increase farm output (the extensive margin), and the second is to increase labour and capital per unit of land (the intensive margin). In a Ricardian world without technical change both ways of intensified factor use are connected to diminishing returns. Extensive growth exists when total farm output increases but average output per worker or per land unit decreases with expanding factor input due to the fact that the additional output produced by every additional input unit becomes smaller (diminishing returns). Extensive growth is problematic because factor input increases faster than output. Consequently, output per capita or real incomes fall with rising total production. This kind of growth is called "immiserising growth" and threatens mainly very low developed economies without sufficient technical change in agriculture.
increase without technical change, even within the limits of extensive growth only due to increased use of labour or capital per unit of land. 26 For the Bulgarian case it is important that within the limits of a pre-industrial or pre-modern agriculture, which does not use scientific-based industrial inputs, rising labour and capital intensity have the potential to significantly boost yields without any technical change. Consequently, a shift from pre-modern to modern agricultural growth only took place during the interwar period when technical change (perhaps total factor productivity or TFP-growth would be a better term) can be identified as a newly-emerging substantial source of farm output growth. Thus, the pivotal question concerning Bulgarian agricultural development during the interwar period is this: Did Bulgarian agriculture only experience a switch from a more land-and labour-based to a more labour-and capital-based extensive growth pattern without technical change, or did a structural break take place, thereby allowing peasants to escape the narrow constraints of Ricardian and Malthusian economics because technical change was a new source of growth?
Labour and land productivity play a key role for discussing the character of Bulgarian agricultural growth from 1887-1939. During the first half of the period (1887-1911) rising agricultural labour input (rural population) and labour intensity defined as labour input per unit of farm land were indeed connected with decreasing farm labour productivity (table 1, figure 3) . 27 This clearly points to diminishing returns of Ricardian extensive growth and the lack of technical change. After the First World War, however, this picture changed dramatically when Bulgarian agriculture started to leave the narrow boundaries of the Ricardian-Malthusian pre-modern economics. Farm labour productivity strongly increased despite rising farm labour input and an accelerated expansion of the agricultural area on marginal lands. Annual labour productivity growth rates changed from -0.51 percent before the First World War to 2.28 percent during the interwar period. Thus, during the interwar period, farm labour productivity stopped falling further, though the factor input in agriculture continued to rise. In a purely Ricardian world without technical change threatened by unchecked diminishing returns, rising input use would have led to falling labour productivity. In fact, the positive development of farm labour productivity during the interwar period offers the potential for substantial technical change after the First World War. Aside from TFP, the second great unknown is the development of capital intensity in Bul- 26 According to the concept of partial factor productivity or the law of diminishing returns, which first was discovered by the French physiocrat Anne Robert Jaques Turgot (1727-1781), only increasing the use of one input (in our case labour or capital) and setting all other inputs as constant will lead to rising output. However, output growth diminishes with every additional input unit. Turgot observed this relationship in agriculture. Increasing labour per land unit led to higher output up to a certain point but in any case, the absolute increase in output diminishes with every additional labour unit. Turgot's law is one of the very few economic axioms, which have held over time. 27 That labour intensity increased is indicated by the rapidly falling land to labour ratio between 1887-1911. The agricultural labour force rose faster than farmland during this period. garian farming. Increased labour productivity could also be a result of rising capital intensity without any gains in TFP.
At the moment, sectoral agricultural production functions used to estimate the dynamics of total factor productivity (TFP-growth)) are not available. In order to examine the two time periods 1892-1911 and 1921-1939 and determine whether technical change or expanding capital intensity caused the rise in Bulgarian agricultural labour productivity, we can resort to Hayami and Ruttan's decomposition of labour productivity (output/labour) into (a) land productivity (output/land) and (b) landman ratio (land/labour):
Decomposing labour productivity allows the following two questions to be answered: − Did any technical change occur in Bulgarian agriculture during the interwar period? − If yes, which kind of technical change dominated? Was it biological or mechanical technical change? Determining whether TFP growth existed in Bulgarian agriculture is still a step forward at the present stage. Moreover, tentatively analysing the character of the prevailing technical change in light of modern development economics -and determining whether it was biological or mechanical -contributes to clarifying the role of Bulgarian peasants in the economic modernisation of the country during the interwar period.
Biological technical change (BTC) aims to increase the crop output per unit of land and to advance the yield of animal products per unit of breeding stock. 28 Both processes contribute to pushing up agricultural net product per unit of land. Improving agricultural implements and machinery represents mechanical technical change (MTC). 29 Indeed, biological (and in modern agriculture, chemical) technology which improves the efficiency of biological processes is more fundamental to productivity growth in agriculture than mechanisation. This was especially true not only in the "periphery" but in most parts of Europe prior to the Second World War.
Still, these few remarks reveal that multiple paths of technological development existed and still exist in agriculture, depending on the factor endowment or relative factor costs of an economy. Technical change aims at facilitating "the substitution of relatively abundant (hence cheap) factors for relatively scarce (hence expensive) factors in the economy". 30 Technical change that considers the relative factor costs and which makes full use of the factors abundantly available represents the most effective way of releasing the constraints on agricultural growth. Consequently, in a densely populated developing economy like Bulgaria before the Second World War where land and cap- 28 Hayami / Ruttan, Agricultural Development, 79. 29 On the basic concepts of technical change in agriculture, see ibidem, 73-90. 30 Ibidem, 73.
ital were scarce (expensive) but labour was abundant (cheap), the development and diffusion of land-saving and labour-using farm technologies were most appropriate to accelerate agricultural growth and concomitantly the best strategy to spread the gains of growth widely into peasant society. Biological technical change (BTC) represented a "land saving" and labour using technical change in the sense that it facilitated the substitution of abundant labour for relatively scarce land to increase farm output. Simply put, in interwar period-Bulgaria, BTC enabled the country to increase farm production despite a tightening land constraint. Less land was needed to achieve the same increase in output because of technical change.
Even under the conditions of pre-modern agriculture which made no or very little use of scientific-based industrial inputs like fertilisers, pesticides and machines, in interwar period-Bulgaria there existed a broad scope for biological technical change. New seeds and breeds, an "increased recycling of soil fertility by more labour-intensive crop systems", biological means to protect plants from pests and diseases, as well as improved land and water management offered the potential for substantial technical change in pre-industrial farming. 31 Such improvements based on BTC were the most important source of agricultural productivity growth in industrialising European economies during the 18 th and 19 th centuries. These improvements were favourable to peasants because BTC-progress was not connected with economies of scale, but often produced diseconomies of scale. In other words, to realise the full potential of BTC, no changes in a small-scale agricultural structure and no radical reorganisation of existing agricultural systems were needed. 32 This was especially true for Europe's "first green revolutions". From this perspective Bulgaria's small scale agricultural structure formed no obstacle for productivity growth.
To interpret the decomposition of labour productivity according to Hayami and Ruttan it is important to know that any kind of BTC is connected with rising land productivity (output/land). However, land productivity can also increase because of rising factor intensity, defined as more labour and/or capital inputs per unit land. It is the development of the land to labour-ratio, which allows us to differentiate between technical change and rising factor intensity as sources of growth. A combination of rising land productivity with a constant land to labour ratio would indicate biological technical change as a source of growth, whereas a decreasing land to labour ratio as a result of rising labour intensity would speak in favour of expanding factor inputs being a main source of growth. The former combination of land productivity and land to labour ratio would represent modern growth, whereas the latter indicates extensive growth.
What does all this mean for Bulgarian agricultural development prior to the Second World War? As shown in tables 2 and 3, as well as in figures 1 and 2, Bulgarian land productivity growth accelerated dramatically after the First World War, whereas the distinctive negative trend of the land to labour ratio nearly faded out, but persisted on a more or less constant level. This strongly indicates that BTC emerged as a substantial source of growth only after the First World War, whereas agricultural growth was purely extensive until the First World War. Obviously mechanical technical change (MTC) did not occur in Bulgaria's agriculture from 1887-1939, keeping in mind that MTC in any case pushes up the land to labour-ratio "because higher output per worker through mechanisation usually requires that the worker cultivate a larger land area". 33 Bearing in mind that rising capital intensity had a very similar effect on the land to labour ratio, the lack of any sustained positive trend in the land to labour ratio speaks against rising capital intensity being a source of agricultural growth. This could only have changed at the end of the 1930s. 34 Table 3 presents the decomposition of Bulgarian farm labour productivity for distinct periods. Comparing 1887-1911 to [1921] [1922] [1923] [1924] [1925] [1926] [1927] [1928] [1929] [1930] [1931] [1932] [1933] [1934] [1935] [1936] [1937] [1938] [1939] suggests that the First World War separated two different periods of Bulgarian agricultural growth. Until 1914, the primary sector was driven by Ricardian-Malthusian dynamics as demonstrated by the diminishing returns of labour. Even if some tiny technical change existed, as revealed by the sluggishly growing land productivity it was too weak to offset the productivity-reducing impact of diminishing returns of labour connected with the strong demographic expansion of rural Bulgaria (table 3) . After the First World War, biological-technical change pushed land productivity to new levels hitherto unknown. Moreover, for the first time, labour productivity growth became positive. 33 Ibidem, 75. 34 That any positive long-term trend in the land to labour ratio was absent means that technical change in Bulgarian peasant agriculture considered relative factor costs in the most effective way according to growth theory. Dividing the time span of 1887-1939 into six sub-periods offers deeper insights into the sources of Bulgarian agricultural growth (table 3) . Indeed, after a long phase of falling peasant incomes as suggested by decreasing farm labour productivity, the grain export-driven agricultural boom starting around 1900 stopped the negative trend in productivity. 35 For the first time, farmland increased faster than the rural population and the improved land to labour ratio slightly encouraged labour productivity. However, the strong expansion of farmland (with annual growth rates of more than 2 percent) led to stagnating yields 1905-1911. The Ricardian law of diminishing returns was doubtless still fully effective. However, the picture changed radically following the First World War. During the 1920s, for the first time both land and labour productivity developed at outstanding rates. The main driver of rising labour productivity was the big push in land productivity. A further drop in the land to labour ratio clearly speaks in favour of strong biological technical change at new dimensions hitherto unknown in Bulgaria, whereas mechanical technical change was absent.
The severe crash of international food markets during the Great Depression hit Bulgaria's export-oriented agriculture very hard. Nevertheless, parts of the population seemed to flow back into farming, as demonstrated by the accelerated fall of the land to labour ratio between 1930 and 1933. 36 Agricultural incomes decreased dramatically during this period, as indicated by the fall in farm labour productivity. This motivated Bulgarian governments to support the ongoing "first green revolution" of increasingly export-oriented, market-sensitive peasants more effectively than ever before. In fact, after 1933 several very different developments coincided which consolidated agriculture. 37 First, the state intensely intervened in the farming sector to stabilise farm incomes. Namely, the introduction of state-controlled foreign trade and especially the trade agreements with Nazi-Germany secured Bulgarian food exports. The demographic transition towards significantly lower birth rates, which Bulgarian peasants had managed without urbanisation faster than any other European country, slowly started to bear fruit. The impact on agricultural productivity of both developments was impressive. During the second half of the 1930s, growth rates of land productivity increased and the land to labour-ratio finally even started to rise. The combination of biological technical change being stronger than ever before, and the beginning of mechanical technical change supported by rising capital intensity boosted labour productivity to outstanding annual rates of almost six percent 1934-1939. That MTC and rising capital intensity could have had an increasing impact on agricultural growth during the second half of 35 Whereas the share of exported grain in total grain output came to 17.6 percent for 1897-1899 it climbed to 34.5, 27.5 and 24.8 percent for 1903-1904, 1905-1906, and 1907-1909 (own calculations, data from Walter K. Weiss-Bartenstein, Bulgariens Volkswirtschaft und ihre Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten. Seine Wirtschaftspolitik und Wirtschaftslage. Berlin 1918, 221). 36 Even if mass dismissals did not occur in Bulgarian industry during the Great Depression, agriculture very likely was the only effective social buffer for many people facing severe wage cuts. 37 More on this in the next section. the 1930s is indicated by an increasing land to labour-ratio and rich evidence in the contemporary Bulgarian literature on agriculture presented in the following section.
To sum up, in replicating Hayami and Ruttan's exercise of decomposing labour productivity we showed that the sources of agricultural growth significantly changed during the interwar period. That Bulgarian peasants crossed the threshold to modern growth in agriculture not only coincided with, but seemed to be strongly connected to, peasants' successful escape from the Malthusian trap. Still, during the 1920s accelerated technical change seems to have played a significant role in quickly accomplishing postwar reconstruction growth. After a short interruption during the Great Depression, the dynamics of agricultural productivity growth further accelerated, which not only continued but reinforced the positive trends of the 1920s.
Bulgaria's "First Green Revolution":
A Qualitative Analysis
In the previous section we reconstructed Bulgarian agricultural growth from 1887-1939 using simple but very robust and meaningful indicators. In the following section the emerging quantitative picture of a successful Bulgarian "first green revolution" during the interwar period is supported by a rich body of qualitative evidence.
As already stressed in the quantitative analysis, the structural changes in Bulgarian farming during the interwar period were dominated by improvements representing land-saving biological technical change: construction of manure-heaps, changes in the rotation systems and introduction of green manure like clover and alfalfa, better cultivation practices such as deeper tillage and well-timed sowing, irrigation and land reclamation, introduction of improved seeds and breeds, pesticides, veterinary and agronomical assistance, transformation to intensive cash crops and partly to dairy stockbreeding and poultry. Expectedly, industrial inputs and chemical technology played a negligible role until the Second World War. This certainly did not stem from any perceived "peasant traditionalism" or ignorance. Given the abundance of cheap rural labour and the price spread between fertilisers and farm output, the decision that Bulgarian farmers and experts made against the widespread application of industrial inputs was fully justified only for purely economic reasons. According to contemporary estimates for example, during the late 1920s fertilisers were 1.5 to 2.2 times more expensive in Bulgaria than in Germany. 38 As a result of those price distortions, their application in a decare (0.1 hectare) with wheat would result in a 52.60 Levs loss for Bulgarian peasants compared with 242 Levs profit for the German farmers. Tests carried out in experimental stations showed an average 25 percent increase (about 50 kg) in cereals output per decare of land when using mineral fertilisers. 39 This, however, was far from enough to cover the additional costs of fertilising. Only intensive crops like tobacco, alfalfa, or fruits and vegetables could be marketed at prices that made the application of fertilisers reasonable. 40 The heavily protected, domestic production of fertilisers offered no option for reducing costs.
High fertiliser prices led the Ministry of Agriculture and Public Properties (MAPP) to place its hopes in the proper preservation of manure and in the introduction of green manure practices. In doing so, Bulgaria successfully copied the 1871-1914 German strategy of pushing up yields, mainly by increased application of organic manure. 41 Experts estimated the country's total needs as being 27-30 million tons of organic manure, while the actual output stood at 12-15 million tons. However, no more than 5 to 6 million tons could be properly preserved. 42 Keeping manure-heaps in each village was proposed as an alternative solution. Due to active campaigning by the MAPP as well as the growing awareness among peasants between 1928 and 1935, nearly 11 000 such dunghills were formed throughout the countryside. It should be noted that there were about 5 500 villages and hamlets, with roughly 2 manure heaps per settlement. With the Recovery and Sustenance of the Productive Forces of Arable Land Act (1941) municipal economic committees were entrusted to draft plans for manure heap construction, as well as for the most rational use of manure. The Bulgarian Agricultural and Co-operative Bank granted interest-free credits for dunghills. 43 Green manuring contributed far more to improving the nutrient supply of crops. According to official statistics, area under clover, alfalfa and other "green manure" crops increased from Frequent draughts threaten Bulgarian agriculture even today. In the late 1930s it became clear that under the given conditions, better cultivation practices, improved seeds and fertilisation were far more applicable to fighting difficulties linked to droughts than were expensive irrigation projects. Several years of testing with various practices and seeds in the Kneža experimental station proved that the specially selected draught-resistant No. 16 wheat variety had 12.6 percent higher yields, even in very dry years. Shallow ploughing at the end of the summer and in the early spring had the same impact as well as deeper autumn tillage, timely sowing, the application of enough manure or fertilisers. 44 Given its gigantic costs, irrigation was hardly an option for boosting biological technical change in Bulgarian agriculture. Rough calculations in the late 1930s estimated that no less than 2-3 billion levs were needed to irrigate the main farmlands. Consequently, at the onset of the Second World War water was supplied to less than 1 percent of the total cultivated land. 45 Without giving up completely on irrigation initiatives (a special act in that respect was passed in 1940) the MAPP concurred with the experts' opinion and instead directed its policy towards disseminating the best cultivation practices, as well as towards the selection and distribution of improved seeds. Several regulations in that respect were enacted in 1936 and 1937. The organisation and control over seeds was entrusted to a specially created state agency with local branches at the rural level. This organisation was tasked with distributing improved seeds at low prices among peasants. 46 In 1939 the parliament forbade the use of non-standardised seeds. Further, all seeds were to be cleaned and disinfected by the selection stations. 47 The Agricultural Bank was responsible for supplying farmers with improved fodder and sugar beet seeds, and with potato seedlings. It also continued its old practice of importing copper sulphate and pesticides and distributing them among co-operatives.
As in developing nations' green revolutions after the Second World War, public agricultural research institutions in Bulgaria played a crucial role in shaping and disseminating biological technical change according to the country's factor endowment. Bulgaria was fast in knitting a dense network of such auxiliary institutions for Research & Development and for knowledge dissemination. During the mid-1930s, five principal experimental stations in Sofia, Ruse, Sadovo, Chirpan and Kneža, seven specialised stations -two on fruit cultivation and one each on tobacco growing, viniculture, sericulture, horticulture and poultry farming -as well as eight test field and many study farms and zoo technical centers were operating in the country. The Plant Protection Institute and the Drought Institute assisted in this work. 48 Research targeted increasing peasant incomes and improving living conditions in rural areas. 49 Public agricultural extension made special efforts to reorganise agriculture by introducing new and more profitable crops and branches of stockbreeding, which enabled a fuller use of rural surplus labour. 50 Experimental stations' success in testing different fertilisers, selecting seeds, plants, and cuttings of superior quality or developing best cultivation practices has already been pointed out. Despite criticism about its overly decentralised structure and not always well-considered locations, 51 the agricultural Research & Development stations substantially contributed to solving many of the main problems that Bulgarian farming was confronted with on the eve of the Second World War.
Agricultural research was one of the key elements in the government's strategy to modernise the primary sector. After the Great Depression, Bulgarian decision makers became more and more convinced that each measure taken by the MAPP should first be tested and studied carefully before implementation. Janev framed it in a straightforward manner: "it is only versatile research that should determine the correctness of our [agricultural] policy". 52 Agricultural R&D was perceived as a necessary first step that would enable state institutions to gain a realistic view of peasant agriculture and its potential. In a second phase, this knowledge was used to design an effective reform program adjusted to the needs of the primary sector.
The Bulgarian Agriculture Centered Development Strategy
The interwar period marked a dramatic shift in the priorities of the Bulgarian political elite. Though Stambolijski and his Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU) had been brutally removed from power in 1923, the priority for industry in Bulgarian economic policy was overturned once and for all. The public administration and all interwar cabinets, regardless of their political affiliation, now focused their attention on agriculture. Most of Stambolijski's agricultural legislation survived his assassination and was modified and even extended by subsequent governments. This cross-party consensus was widely acknowledged by contemporary experts. In his "Program for 48 Zemedelskite opitin stancii i kontrolni instituti v Bălgarija, Chimija i industrija 13 (1935), no. 6, 237-252. 49 Bulgarian Land" the former minister of agriculture Grigor Vasilev 53 insists that "in general, all Bulgarian parties, with the sole exception of the communists, share similar economic stands when agriculture is in question. All of them are for small and medium sized private property, for easy accessible and cheap credit, against usury, in favour of the co-operative movement".
Despite the growing interventionism both in Bulgaria and in the world during the Great Depression, the state preferred to stimulate agricultural modernisation through the market. Instead of direct subsidies, with the sole exception of some cereals, the government resorted to a system of stimuli to advance agricultural exports. Driven both by political and commercial considerations in the late 1930s, the state helped the primary sector align itself with the world market through export subsidies, dissemination of information about foreign markets, development of quality standards and control. This type of growth policy differed substantially from heavy protectionism and the inward-oriented import substitution that was at the core of Bulgarian industrial policy. The new growth strategy based on agriculture aimed at promoting export instead of substituting imports. Consequently, contemporaries referred to that strategic choice in economic policy as "moderate interventionism" and "mild" pro-market protectionism. 54 Since 1935 the Ministry of Economy, later reorganised into the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Labour, was granted the right to introduce compulsory control over the quality and the packing of Bulgarian export commodities that were mainly of agricultural origin. Special regulations were enacted by the ministry for the export of cattle, eggs, grapes, fruits, vegetables, etc. 55 There was a consensus among contemporary experts that "structural changes" within the most dynamic sub-sectors of agriculture which took place during the second half of 1930s were due mainly to the "export trade that has opened the foreign markets for Bulgarian fruits". 56 Through export promotion, the state indirectly but decisively strengthened the ongoing trend of declining self-subsistence for small farms. Agricultural policy supported the adaptation of peasant agriculture to the high requirements of the world market, and public authorities built up the necessary infrastructure so that export became profitable for peasants. Indeed, the growing peasant orientation towards export was the driving force of the agricultural transformation.
In a period of collapsing international food markets and rapidly growing agricultural protectionism in Western Europe after the First World War, export-oriented agricultural development could only proceed in Bulgaria because of Germany's expansionist foreign policy. Even though this policy dates back to the Weimar Republic, it was especially war-preparing Nazi Germany that (ab)used trade policy to enlarge and consolidate 53 its sphere of influence in Southeast Europe. Given the canonical view of Bulgaria as a victim of Nazi "informal imperialism", it is worth emphasising that Hitler in fact secured the necessary Bulgarian export outlets via a sophisticated system of heavily state regulated foreign trade. After several unsuccessful attempts to secure alternative trade agreements with France and Britain, Germany stepped in as the only major market open to Bulgaria. Crucially, Berlin was ready to exchange fertiliser and farm machinery for imports of tobacco, fruit and vegetables.
Two essential aims guided Bulgarian agricultural policy during and after the Great Depression: securing social peace and, to a lesser extent, promoting agricultural modernisation. These objectives were partly conflicting, but as the post-Second World War experience of less developed countries has demonstrated, modernisation could not be achieved without a minimum of social peace. Bulgarian agricultural policy aimed at stabilising farm prices and thus the dramatically falling peasant incomes, which, even before the crisis, were dangerously close to subsistence levels. The Bulgarian marketing board Harnoiznos subsidised mainly grain production for social reasons. Indeed, this artificially perpetuated the traditional crop mix, which was not adjusted to the changing international food markets and the grain overproduction crisis. Thus, the achievements of the second half of the 1930s should not be ascribed as much to the emerging "moderate" interventionism, but to other factors of far more fundamental nature within the peasant society which were supported by the export-oriented parts of government policy.
First of all, the impressive economic flexibility and adaptability of Bulgarian peasants has to be mentioned. 57 Fundamental changes in the crop mix were not initiated by the state. On the contrary, driven by political and social considerations through Harnoiznos, the government actually slowed down the process. In the early 1920s, in pursuit of a new cash crop in reaction to falling wheat prices, Bulgarian farms shifted rapidly into tobacco, a crop particularly suited to the soils and climate of some of the poorest areas of the southern fringe of the country. After the collapse of global tobacco prices in the late 1920s, a new phase of diversification began, thus diverting the crop mix towards industrial crops, grapes, fruits and vegetables. This latter move was fully in line with the trend towards land-saving, labour-intensive farming. Undeniably, the changing crop mix was the main manifestation of the ongoing process of agricultural transformation. 58 In Italy and Spain the export-oriented intensification of Mediterranean farming took place beginning in the late 19th century. A similar strategy in Bulgaria after the First World War brought the same results: rising yields per hectare but only a modest improvement of per capita incomes. That Bulgarian agriculture followed the "Mediterranean path" of agricultural intensification during the interwar period meant that its "first agricultural revolution" proceeded quite differently from those in Western and Central Europe, which focused on livestock farming. Indeed, the share of livestock production in total farm output almost halved in Bulgaria during the interwar period from 54.3 to 28.8 per cent (table 4) . Furthermore, the chosen crop-based intensification strategy reflected Bulgarian industrialisation. Market-oriented Mediterranean cash crop production rested not just on fruits, vegetables, and wine, but also on a wide range of industrial plants, namely tobacco, cotton, oil-seeds, sugar-beet, etc. 59 Between 1921 and 1939, the share of commercial intensive crops in total farm production doubled from 14.4 to 29.2 percent (table 4).
Gerschenkron blamed Bulgarian agriculture for not producing sufficient raw materials for Bulgaria's rising textile industry. 60 However, our data tells a different story. Until 1914 raw wool production increased by 1.2 percent per year to supply not only peasant households but the woolen industry, the biggest sector of Bulgarian modern manufacturing. After the First World War, cotton gradually replaced wool processing as the leading industry; Bulgarian peasants reacted immediately. Between 1921 and 1939, cotton fiber production increased annually by 23 percent, while the raw wool output started to fall (table 4) . This is certainly not the economic behaviour of backward peasants ignoring market opportunities. On the contrary, the dynamics of industrial growth and industry's demand for raw materials determined the output of industrial plants and not vice versa, as Gerschenkron has suggested. Peasants sensitively reacted to the demand for industrial raw materials provided that it was profitable for them.
The second fundamental factor that assisted agricultural transformation was the outstanding flexibility of the peasant demographic behaviour. From the mid-19th century onwards, population growth accelerated dramatically, reaching its peak in the early 1920s at just over 2 percent per annum. Prior to 1914 it was this explosive population growth that consumed any GDP growth, thus reducing per capita income growth to almost zero. The population boom was due to both an increase in fertility and a decline in mortality. However, there remains a large measure of uncertainty over the ultimate causes of the fertility explosion. The most plausible interpretation is that social constraints on marriage and fertility were loosened as hundreds of thousands of new hectares were opened up for settlement by young peasant families during the second half of the 19th century, especially after 1878. 61 With a crude birth rate of 2 percent per annum there was a real danger that population growth would not just keep per capita income at zero, but it would outstrip the agricultural growth rate, thus further impoverishing Bulgarian peasants. During the mid-1920s Bulgaria was genuinely in danger of tipping over the Malthusian cliff, with population growth outrunning the economy's capacity to sustain it. But as the economic-demographic equilibrium was endangered, peasant behavior changed radically within a few years. Beginning in the mid-1920s, Bulgaria experienced the most rapid decline of birth rates ever recorded. It was peasant Bulgaria, which accomplished this astonishing achievement without industrialisation and urbanisation or support by any public demographic policy to restrain the demographic expansion. By the mid-1930s the rate of population growth had halved and continued to fall precipitately into the Intensive crop production contains all industrial plants (tobacco, sugar beet, sugar broom, sunflower, colza, sesame, anise, fennel, mint, peanuts, soy beans, opium, poppy, hops, cotton seeds, cotton fiber, hemp seeds, hemp fiber, flax seeds, flax fiber), all vegetables (cabbage, onions, peppers, tomatoes, other vegetables), all fruits (including grapes, wine, melons, as well as attar of roses); 2) annual growth rates of cotton fiber production 1887-1911 only refers to the period 1903-1911; 3) Total sector income contains income from farming, forestry, hunting, fishing, rural home industry, implicit rents from rural dwellings, and of wage labour in agriculture (Ivanov, Gross Domestic Product). Besides farming, the second-most important sectoral and on-farm-activity was rural home industry, mainly producing textiles for self-consumption.
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Second World War. 62 The reasons behind the outstanding flexibility of the peasant demographic behaviour have not yet been studied systematically. However, the strong Bulgarian efforts in primary education -as part of the 19 th century national awakening -and especially the revolutionary successes in female education very likely played a crucial role for explaining peasants' capacity to prevent a Malthusian catastrophe, even under the conditions of strictly restricted emigration after the First World War. 63 All in all it seems that during the interwar period the conscious decision of peasants to restrain fertility, combined with strongly accelerated land productivity growth and peasants' rising market orientation were the driving forces behind the first-ever productivity-based Bulgarian agricultural expansion. Emerging state interventionism in agriculture only supported this development -very effectively despite some shortcomings -but it did not cause them. It is obvious that without the high levels of both primary education for the peasants and the high degree of participation in what Fukuyama 64 calls "intermediate structures of sociability" like cooperatives, Agrarian Party local clubs, education clubs (chitalishta) etc., the state policy would have had a negligible impact.
Well before its liberation in 1878, Bulgarian society had reached a "national consensus" on the importance of mass education. Schools traditionally received approx. 2-2.5% of GDP and the Ministry of Education enjoyed a privileged status among the ministries. By the 1930s, Bulgarian society began to reap the benefits of several decades of sustained investment in mass literacy. Primary education enrolment between 1920 and 1940 significantly increased from 812 000 to 1 007 000. By 1900 general literacy was 18.4 percent. 35 years later, 55 percent of the population was literate, while the 1946 census recorded almost total literacy for both sexes (91.7 for male and 91.8 for female). Good inroads have also been made in secondary schooling, which increased by a factor of two during the interwar years. 65 More importantly, between the wars specialised agricultural education and vocational training attracted the attention of both the state authorities and private institutions like the Rockefeller Foundation. In the late 1930s, four secondary agricultural schools, 13 schools of practical agriculture and rural domestic economy, a Higher Institute of Rural Domestic Economy and a Faculty of Agriculture and Forestry at the Sofia University were operating in different regions of the country to foster capacity building in agriculture and disseminate agronomical knowledge at the grass-roots level 66 (Table 5 ).
According to the Bulgarian country report presented at the Rural Life conference, organised in 1939 by the League of Nations, the purpose of all those schools and institutions was "namely to impart the necessary knowledge and skills for productive work in farming and rural domestic economy, and thus help to increase agricultural production and improve village life". 67 During the late 1930s, several thousand young boys and girls were graduating on an annual basis from those special schools. Furthermore, in each of the seven administrative regions of Bulgaria, the MAPP had its district rural economy office and a local agricultural institute embracing the work done both by the local agricultural experts and that of the staff of agricultural colleges.
Bulgarian interwar rural society demonstrated a high propensity to self-organisation (intermediate sociability structures) and sustained communitarian life in the countryside -co-operatives, Agrarian Party grass-root structures, chitalishta etc. Revising the results of several decades of development programmes in the Third World, Hayami and Ruttan underscore the importance of well-developed co-operative networks for the successful implementation of development projects. 68 Contemporary experts also emphasised the crucial value of Bulgarian coops for increasing rural savings and funnelling them into land improvement and even into industrial projects. Warriner 69 provided ample evidence of how, through co-operation and moderate state intervention, villages could supply capital for investment in manufacturing. The Vâtcha hydro-electric power station and its adjacent irrigation system, or the canning and packing factories that mushroomed in the Bulgarian countryside during the late 1930s were opened thanks to entrepreneurial co-operatives.
To conclude this section, a capable primary schooling system and flourishing "third sector" institutions of an active rural civic society strongly supported the modernisa- tion of Bulgaria's peasant agriculture during the interwar period. 70 Co-operatives and the agrarian movement were vivid manifestations of the high levels of "interpersonal general trust" 71 present in Bulgarian villages. It was this propensity to "spontaneous sociability" that powered many of the positive developments in Bulgarian society and its economy in the 1930s, at least regarding agricultural transformation, accelerated land productivity growth, as well as economic and demographic flexibility. The Bulgarian "authoritative bottom-up approach" of agricultural modernisation was carried out by (at best) semi-democratic governments which nevertheless had a deep understanding that only a development strategy based on the potential of the peasants and which spread the gains of growth widely into peasant society could prevent a social catastrophe and absolute rural impoverishment.
Conclusion
Summarising the experience of many modernisation programs in less developed countries, Hayami and Ruttan 72 defined two necessary conditions which have to be simultaneously met in order to escape the Ricardian-Malthusian "misery" of low and declining rural incomes caused by population growth: − The development and the diffusion of land-saving and labour-using farm technologies in close cooperation between peasants, public research and agricultural policy. − Rapid employment growth in the non-agricultural sectors. During the interwar period Bulgaria met the first precondition in an exemplary way, even compared to modern green revolutions of the Post-Second World War period, whose experiences Hayami and Ruttan summarise as follows:
"In the agriculture of developing countries, in which land is becoming increasingly scarce and expensive relative to labour as population pressure increases against land resources, the development of biological and chemical technologies is the most efficient way to promote agricultural growth. Technological progress of this type tends to make small-scale operations relatively more efficient. It thereby induces an agrarian structure characterized by a unimodal distribution of small family farms rather than a bimodal distribution consisting of large commercial farmers and large numbers of landless or near-landless labourers. Moreover, because such technological progress tends to be generally biased, or at least neutral, toward labour use, it helps counteract the effect of population pressure on land rent and wages. […] It is clear that a necessary condition for escape from the Ricardian trap is land-saving and labour-using technical change. But even if such technology is developed, its contribution to growth and equity will be small if it does not achieve rapid diffusion However, Bulgaria failed to meet the second precondition to achieve a full-scale "first agrarian revolution". To achieve the necessarily swift labour transfer from the primary to the secondary sector, two conditions are mandatory: (1) a vibrant secondary sector, which had still reached a certain extent before industrialisation, and (2) a rapidly growing manufacturing sector during industrialisation. Only if a still reasonably large manufacturing sector's growth accelerates significantly during industrialisation, a sufficient large portion of the expanding rural population can be pulled into the non-agricultural labour force, and thereby exert a swift, positive impact on labour productivity and incomes in agriculture. Declining population growth is no effective solution for the low productivity and incomes in agriculture in the short term due to the fact that any reduction in demographic expansion requires at least a generation to exert a significant impact on employment and rural poverty. 74 Indeed, the Bulgarian problem was not sluggish agricultural growth acting like a brake on the growth of the entire economy as once thought. But the tiny modern manufacturing sector should not be blamed either. Bulgarian interwar annual growth rates of large scale industry were by all means respectable, with estimates varying between 3.6 75 and 7.8 percent. 76 Moreover, strong voices in the literature insist that by the late 1930s "Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia, crossed the threshold of industrialisation". 77 However, even if modern manufacturing developed dynamically during the 1920s and 1930s, it was simply too small to absorb a large fraction of the rural labour surplus. 78 Bulgarian Agricultural Growth During the Interwar Period A Western European "19 th century full-scale first green revolution" characterised by simultaneously increasing land and farm labour productivity clearly outpacing the low levels of traditional farming was simply impossible to achieve for interwar period Bulgaria, even though a dynamic peasant agriculture highly responsive to economic incentives still existed. Looking only at land productivity and the causes behind its dynamic yield growth, Bulgaria's agriculture clearly entered into the stage of modern growth during the interwar period. However, in stark contrast to industrialising Western Europe's "first green revolutions" before the First World War in interwar-Bulgaria, the impact of biological technical change obviously did not induce an increase in farm labour productivity strong enough to clearly outstrip the low levels of labour productivity in traditional farming. Farm labour productivity at the end of the 1930s was not very different from the level at the end of the 1880s (figure 3). But the reason for farm labour productivity's long-term stagnation was not a lack of dynamism in Bulgaria's peasant agriculture. Instead, during the interwar period there was literally no place to go for the growing rural population; Bulgarian Industry could not absorb the rural labour surplus, and emigration was not possible.
Trapped as they were in the villages, young rural generations were obviously displeased with the situation. With higher levels of education than their parents, young Bulgarian peasants were indeed not less critical of the political elite but certainly far less militant and ready to compromise. By adopting pro-agricultural policies and avoiding direct involvement on the Eastern Front during the Second World War, the political establishment managed to keep the latent rural discontent at bay. After the mid-1920s, young peasant generations forewent the revolts that their parents and grandparents had attempted (in 1899, 1918 and 1923) . At about the same time, the agrarian movement gradually abandoned its radical anti-urban rhetoric and started to collaborate with "bourgeois" politicians. In the early 1930s, when BANU returned to power in a coalition with three other "urban" parties, it was widely acknowledged that its representatives in the cabinet were "self-restrained and earnest". This was very different from the first BANU government of Stambolijski, whose agrarian ministers behaved "lofty and arrogant with other classes and the intelligentsia". 79 This indeed rules out accusations from Gerschenkron and others that agricultural modernisation was protracted by the political lobbyism of a "pre-modern" class. Radicalism was isolated in small pockets of (almost)-landless peasants with no prospects for finding alternative employment in industry. Communists understandably took advantage of this for recruiting its guerrilla detachments. However, to say that in the 1930s and this was almost the same occupational structure as in 1887. In fact, no structural transformation from an agrarian to an industrial economy did occur in Bulgaria 1887-1939. According to Ivanov and Stanev 1940s the Bulgarian village was "pregnant with communism" 80 is to confuse traditional Russophilia and fashionable-at-the-time authoritarianism with a peasant support of Bolshevik-style land collectivisation. Given the adverse conditions of the interwar period, it was still a remarkable achievement that the emerging biological technical change managed to offset the depressing impact of diminishing returns on agricultural growth and productivity. During the interwar period, productivity-reducing diminishing returns were inevitably connected to the ongoing dynamic rural population growth and unchecked expansion of farmland on marginal lands. Hence, re-establishing peasant productivity after the First World War and stabilising peasant incomes on a low level was a significant achievement. Only biological technical change enabled Bulgarian peasants to escape the Malthusian trap, which considered in isolation represented a secular breakthrough to modernity. This peasant achievement is to be assessed all the more positively because peasant societyonce rather depreciatory labelled as the "traditional sector" -had to manage agricultural modernisation and the demographic transition with only modest support from the tiny urban-industrial sector.
The old view of development from Marxism to Liberalism saw the destruction of the peasant economy and society as inescapable "social costs" of industrialisation. 81 In developing economics and economic history, this view was a dogma that was not called into question until the 1960s and 1970s. Going back to Karl Marx and the English classical economists, creating a large industrial reserve army of expropriated peasants was seen as a mandatory precondition of industrialisation, not only to advance capital formation via low wages but also to encourage mass demand, thereby forming a domestic market. This canonical view was later challenged, even for 18 th century Great Britain. As Robert C. Allen concluded in his seminal study on agricultural development from 1450 to 1850 in the English South Midlands, the rise of large estates during the 18 th century at the expense of small farms did not accelerate economic growth because "the basic problem was that the agricultural revolution […] preceded the region's industrial revolution by at least a century. Instead of contributing to the growth of manufacturing, the premature release of labour from agriculture caused nothing but poverty". 82 82 Robert C. Allen, Enclosure and the Yeoman, Oxford 1992, 262. Indeed, one of the main problems of modern developing countries is not to create a sufficient large labour surplus for industry but to prevent an uncontrolled rural migration completely overcharging the absorption capacity of modern industry and urban areas. Under the conditions of strong rural population growth and a tiny industrial sector, like in Bulgaria before the Second World War, economic policy should try to improve the absorption capacity of agriculture and develop the entire rural economy (Michael Lipton, Why Poor People Stay Poor. Urban Bias in World Development. Aldershot 1989; Bruce boosting agricultural productivity was essential for successful industrialisation, the role of agriculture in industrialisation has been downsised in recent research, particularly but not only for Great Britain. 83 During the 19 th century in many industrialising countries agriculture did not provide a large home market for manufactures. Instead, exports and urban demand absorbed the bulk of the industrial output. Agricultural savings formed only a minor source of non-agricultural investments. Thus, Geschenkron's accusation that Bulgarian agriculture precluded industrialisation because its demand for consumer goods, modern farm tools and machinery was too low is simply misleading. In any case, the Bulgarian domestic market was too small to provide the sufficient demand, which made industrialisation worthwhile. Industrialisation in Bulgaria depended on export markets, which did not exist during the crisis-ridden interwar period characterised by globally rising protectionism and a collapsing world trade system.
As a "development traditionalist", Gerschenkron rejected Bulgaria's agricultural-centered development strategy as a fundamental mistake because it excluded Bulgaria's industrialisation and thus the transition to modern growth. Bearing in mind that Bulgaria was a small economy, not rich in natural resources and confronting highly-protected Western export markets for its potential industrial products, it is clear that Gerschenkron's program for a state-led enforced industrialisation based on a massive diversion of resources out of agriculture -in fact an imitation of the Soviet-style industrialisation, only without Bolshevik terror -would have resulted in a disaster. 84 It seems to make more sense to closer analyse developments within the tiny urban-industrial sector, or within the world economy to explain Bulgaria's failed industrialisation instead of pointing the finger at Bulgarian peasants. Realising productivity growth was definitely no problem for Bulgarian peasant agriculture subject to the conditions of appropriate circumstances outside agriculture. In our opinion, there is no reason to complain about a self-inflicted Bulgarian "modernisation failure" during the interwar period. That biological technical change would develop into an important source of agricultural growth was by no means a given after the First World War. This only happened thanks to Bulgarian peasants who consciously decided to switch to intensive commercial cash crops. Their efforts were successfully seconded by the decision of domestic political elites to concentrate scarce resources on the development of peasant agriculture and to support the export-oriented peasant approach to economic modernisation, which had already emerged without any government intervention. Political considerations tailored to prevent a social catastrophe and maintain economic growth played a vital role in building this interwar cross-party consensus. Now we know that this was a visionary policy. Development economics needed four more decades to learn that in a developing nation where peasants form the overwhelming majority of the population, concentrating on agriculture and creating market access for the masses of agricultural producers is the most effective strategy during the early stages of development. This strategy does not exclude industrialisation, but rather than speeding up capital formation in the manufacturing sector, it avoids extreme rural impoverishment due to the reckless allocation of resources away from agriculture.
ABSTRACT
The classical view of Bulgaria's failed industrialisation prior to the Second World War was established by Alexander Gerschenkron. According to his interpretation, an inherently backward small peasant agriculture and well-organised peasantry not only retarded growth in agriculture but obstructed any possible industrialisation strategy. Following Hayami and Ruttan, we utilise the decomposition of farm labour productivity into land productivity, and land-to-man ratio to analyse the sources of growth in Bulgaria's agriculture 1887-1939. Our results show that Bulgaria's peasants did cross the threshold to modern growth during the interwar period. Rich qualitative evidence supports the findings of our quantitative analysis that contrary to Gerschenkron's view and conventional wisdom, Bulgaria's peasants substantially contributed to the modernisation of Bulgaria's economy and society. We interpret our results in light of modern development economics, and conclude that agriculture formed no impediment to Bulgaria's industrialisation. The reasons that a "large industrial spurt" did not occur in Bulgaria until 1945 are not to be found in the agricultural sector.
